Multijurisdictional Approach to Biosurveillance, Kansas City by Hoffman, Mark A. et al.
An electronic reporting system for a network of 22 lab-
oratories was implemented in Kansas City, Missouri, with
an independent organization acting as a data clearing-
house between the reporting laboratories and public health
departments. The system ran in tandem with conventional
reporting methods. Laboratory test orders and results were
aggregated and mapped to a common nomenclature.
Reports were delivered through a secure Internet connec-
tion to the Kansas City Health Department (KCHD); during
the first 200 days of operation, 359 qualified results were
delivered electronically to KCHD. Data were received more
quickly than they were with conventional reporting meth-
ods: notification of chlamydia cases arrived 2 days earlier,
invasive group A streptococcal disease cases arrived 2.3
days sooner, and salmonellosis cases arrived 2.7 days
sooner. Data were more complete for all demographic
fields, including address, age, sex, race, and date of birth.
Two hundred fourteen cases reported electronically were
not received by conventional means.
B
iosurveillance is the automated monitoring of infor-
mation sources of potential value in detecting an
emerging epidemic, whether naturally occurring or the
result of bioterrorism. Information sources that can be
monitored for early warning include purchases of nonpre-
scription medication (1) and symptoms reported during
ambulatory care (2). Although these sources offer opportu-
nities for early detection, they may also lead to high rates
of false-positive reactions. A more definitive tool for bio-
surveillance is the electronic reporting of diagnostic results
confirming the presence of a pathogen.
Heightened concerns about bioterrorism have led pub-
lic health organizations to reevaluate methods used to
report diseases. Currently, most healthcare providers noti-
fy public health organizations of reportable diseases by
telephone, fax, or mail (3). These techniques generally
delay the communication of confirmatory test results and
notification of the appropriate public health organization
(4). Underreporting is a major concern with traditional dis-
ease surveillance strategies (5); even cases of severe dis-
eases sometimes go unreported (6). In addition, substantial
variability exists in the completeness of the information
sent to public health; initial reports often include only the
test result and the patient name. They lack demographic
details that are useful to public health officials, requiring
them to perform followup calls to get the additional infor-
mation (7). These delays and inconsistencies may impair
the ability of public health officials to detect or respond to
a bioterrorist event. One solution to these deficiencies is to
use an electronic system to report disease to public health
authorities.
Three approaches to electronic disease reporting are
feasible. The first approach (Figure 1A) requires each
healthcare provider to standardize clinical results (i.e., by
using the Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine
[SNOMED]) before sending results electronically to the
appropriate authority. Researchers in Pittsburgh, working
in an integrated delivery network that used a single data
dictionary to minimize the difficulty of reconciling dis-
parate coding systems, found this approach effective for
electronic disease reporting (8). However, developing this
type of system can be challenging because of the difficul-
ty in updating multiple data dictionaries (translation tables
that associate terms from multiple organizations). The sec-
ond approach (Figure 1B) requires the use of result stan-
dardization software (which collects data from multiple
sites and attempts to automatically associate terms to stan-
dard terms) at public health facilities. This approach places
the responsibility for technology and personnel with the
public health organizations. The third approach to elec-
tronic reporting (Figure 1C) involves an intermediary
organization that aggregates the data and distributes stan-
dardized reports to public health organizations. Single
jurisdiction systems using this approach have been devel-
oped in Hawaii and Indianapolis (9,10). We developed a
multiple-jurisdiction data clearinghouse system (11) and
assessed the benefits of the system in terms of timeliness,
data completeness, and geographic depth of coverage. 
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The electronic reporting system consisted of three par-
ticipating groups: data contributors, the clearinghouse, and
public health organizations (Figure 2). Four nonaffiliated
healthcare organizations of varying size (consisting of 2, 2,
5, and 13 facilities) participated in the system. The small-
est facilities were regional care centers with 49 beds each;
the largest was an urban hospital with 650 beds. All partic-
ipating organizations used the same laboratory information
system (LIS) (PathNet, Cerner Corp., Kansas City, MO) to
document clinical microbiology results. Microbiology
reports were constructed from a combination of codified
entries representing the pathogen and discrete observations
or free text entries added by the user. The data dictionaries
and test catalogs at each organization were unique and
were not referenced to standardized vocabularies. During
the implementation of the electronic reporting system, the
data dictionaries and test catalogs from the participating
organizations were uploaded to the data clearinghouse;
entries representing reportable pathogens or tests with the
potential to yield reportable results were mapped to a stan-
dardized vocabulary.
We established agreements to assure security within the
system. Surveillance data reported to public health organi-
zations are exempted from the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act. Legal agreements designating the
supplier of the clearinghouse system as a business associ-
ate with full reporting capability were established with the
participating organizations. These agreements, combined
with stringent access controls (physical and procedural
security measures), encryption of identifiable information,
and virtual private network (VPN) secured communica-
tions and ensured protection of confidentiality. Interagency
agreements between public health organizations in the
Kansas City area provided a further framework for the
appropriate exchange of data across jurisdictional bound-
aries. For example, an agreement between KCHD and the
state of Kansas recognized Kansas City, Missouri, as a
county of Kansas for purposes of metropolitan surveil-
lance.
Batch extraction scripts ran daily at each data contribu-
tor, pulling new laboratory test orders, laboratory results,
and patient demographic information. Demographic infor-
mation was encrypted before being transferred to the data
clearinghouse through a VPN (Cisco Systems, San Jose,
CA). The data were loaded into a data warehouse (Oracle
Corp., Redwood Shores, CA) and checked for errors and
duplication; data mapping was then performed
(Informatica Corp., Redwood City, CA). Microbiologic
results identifying reportable pathogens were mapped
automatically to a common nomenclature to standardize
the varying names between the participating organizations.
Procedure orders (i.e., stool culture) deemed relevant to
the detection of an infectious disease outbreak were also
mapped to a common nomenclature. After these process-
ing steps, the results were used to build two reports that
were delivered through the Internet to KCHD using a VPN
secured account. One report provided trending information
on orderable procedures; the other provided results from
microbiology tests (Figure 3). KCHD staff reviewed the
reports using a report viewer (BusinessObjects Corp., San
Jose, CA). Reports summarizing the results reported to
KCHD were also delivered to the institution of origin.
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Figure 1. Comparison of technical approaches to biosurveillance:
A) standardization, filtering, and checking for duplication done at
contributor site; B) translation and checking for duplication at pub-
lic health site; C) data repository.
Figure 2. Data clearinghouse system architecture. Data are
extracted from the laboratory information network at contributing
sites and encrypted into a flat file. These are then delivered by vir-
tual private network (VPN)–secured file transfer protocol to the
clearinghouse where they are subjected to data warehousing
processes. Jurisdictional filters are applied to the data to construct
reports with data appropriate for the recipient. KCHD, Kansas City
Health Department; KDHE, Kansas Department of Health and
Environment.Jurisdictional filters were applied to deliver appropriate
data to the Kansas Department of Health and Environment
(these data will be analyzed separately).
We evaluated reports received through both conven-
tional and electronic reporting between March 29, 2002,
and September 2, 2002, for data completeness and timeli-
ness. Disease reporting in Kansas City requires that public
health officials know the name of the testing facility and
the patient’s age, date of birth, race, sex, address, and tele-
phone number. As each conventional or electronic report
was received, KCHD documented whether each required
data element was provided and documented the date on
which conventional reports were received. Timeliness was
determined by comparing this date with the date that a
reportable pathogen was first posted to data clearinghouse.
Reports received only through electronic means were
evaluated to confirm that they satisfied KCHD reporting
criteria. This review included confirmation of appropriate
jurisdictional concerns, origin of isolate (appropriate body
site), and exclusion of false-positive results.
Geographic information system maps, showing the res-
idential zip code of patients with reportable isolates, were
delivered to KCHD by using ArcIMS (ESRI, Redlands,
CA). Users could select a pathogen and observe the zip
codes of patients with confirmed cases. Geographic cover-
age maps were generated by using the zip codes of all
patients whose results were evaluated by the system.
Critical isolate alerts were also built into the system. A
single instance of Bacillus anthracis,  Coxiella burnetii,
Yersinia pestis, or any Brucella species would trigger alerts
sent to the pagers of on-call public health officers and
supervisors.
Results
The electronic data clearinghouse study was conducted
in tandem with conventional reporting at all sites. In 2002,
conventional reports to KCHD originated from laborato-
ries (52%), infection control practitioners (34%), blood
centers (6%), private physicians (4%), and other sources
(4%). Personnel involved in conventional reporting were
generally unaware of the electronic reporting system; their
management was instructed in the dual reporting require-
ment. Our review of reports received through both the
clearinghouse and conventional reporting identified 144
isolate reports. An additional 213 cases arrived only
through electronic reporting (Table 1). We reviewed the
addresses of the patient and reporting laboratory to verify
that a report was in the KCHD jurisdiction. Table 1 lists the
specific pathogens documented through this system and
the average improvement in timeliness for each pathogen.
Timeliness improved for all pathogens; the improvements
for chlamydia, invasive group A streptococcal infections,
and salmonellosis cases were statistically significant
(Table 1). One chlamydia case arrived 20 days earlier
through clearinghouse reports.
Many case reports were only received through electron-
ic reporting (Table 1). In particular, giardiasis and hepati-
tis C were underreported. Sexually transmitted diseases,
including chlamydia, gonorrhea, and syphilis, were also
underreported. 
The data clearinghouse received all cases reported by
traditional means for diseases that were consistently docu-
mented by using microbiology reports. The null value pre-
cluded the use of the Chandra Sekar-Deming capture-
recapture technique used to assess reporting coverage in
other electronic reporting systems (8,9). Diagnostic results
verifying some diseases, especially viral diseases such as
hepatitis and HIV, are sometimes documented using
microbiology reports but are often documented using LIS
applications from which results were not evaluated by the
data clearinghouse.
Demographic information about patients was provided
more often through clearinghouse reports than through
reports received in tandem by traditional means. This
improvement was statistically significant for patient
address, race, age, date of birth, and sex, as determined by
McNemar’s test (Table 2).
Geographic coverage was examined by using ArcIMS
(ESRI) to plot the zip codes of patients whose data were
evaluated by the system, independent of the result (Figure
4). The breadth of geographic coverage provided by the
system extended well beyond the Kansas City metropoli-
tan area. The system evaluated patients from all regions of
Missouri and Kansas, as well as out-of-state residents. 
Discussion
We evaluated a data clearinghouse approach to biosur-
veillance using clinical microbiologic laboratory data.
Electronic reporting of communicable diseases has been
tested in other communities, including Hawaii, Pittsburgh,
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Figure 3. Example of a pathogen-trending report showing the
trends for a user-selected set of pathogens. Other reports include
facility summaries, detailed-line listings, and age trends.and Indianapolis (8–10). Unlike these earlier studies, our
data clearinghouse system gathered data from nonaffiliat-
ed healthcare providers, applied a centralized data-map-
ping team to provide efficiency of scale, and delivered data
to multiple governmental entities with jurisdictions in a
region that crossed state lines. 
Following the bioterrorist attack involving anthrax
tainted letters during fall 2001, we developed and
deployed this system rapidly. Formal design of the system
began in December 2001; the system was fully operational
by March 29, 2002. The use of standardized extraction
scripts and a centralized data-mapping operation expedited
this work. The data clearinghouse system was easy for cli-
nicians to use because data extraction was automatic and
did not require them to modify their workflow, unlike
other biosurveillance systems that require users to reenter
data into a Web page (12,13). This clearinghouse was also
the first reported system to provide laboratory order-trend-
ing information to public health organizations. 
Analysis of the data clearinghouse system adds to the
evidence that electronic reporting of disease can offer sub-
stantial benefits to public health. Our finding that electron-
ic reporting improves timeliness is consistent with reports
from Hawaii and other areas (9). Notably, our system
attained a significant improvement in timeliness of detec-
tion for Salmonella spp., as well as an improvement in
underreporting of this pathogen. Salmonella and other
pathogens tracked by the clearinghouse, including
Shigella,  E. coli O157:H7,  Giardia lamblia, and
Cryptosporidium parvum are classified by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention as Class B bioterrorism
agents: food or water safety threats. Class B agents have
been used in biologic crimes, including the Dulles,
Oregon, contamination of salad bars with salmonellae in
which 751 people became ill (14). 
We compared the completeness of the data delivered by
electronic reporting to data delivered by conventional
means and found improvement for every data element
evaluated. Greater completeness of data delivered by elec-
tronic reports is a tangible benefit for both healthcare
providers and public health workers as it reduces followup
requests for additional information. Some fields, address
in particular, had low values for completeness even for
electronic reporting, which reflects gaps in the information
in patient demographic information that is provided by
physician offices to clinical laboratories.
The data clearinghouse system reduced underreporting,
especially for sexually transmitted diseases and enteric
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Table 1. Comparison of reporting times between conventional and electronic reporting and evaluation of reporting coverage 
Pathogen  Average days earlier
a  Electronic and traditional
b  Electronic only
c  Total reports  Reporting improvement
d (%) 
Campylobacter sp.  0.6  10  7  17  70 
Chlamydia trachomatis  2.2
e  29  81  110  279 
Cryptosporidium parvum  0.0  1  -  1  - 
Escherichia coli O157:H7  0.0  1  2  3  200 
Giardia lamblia  0.0  1  12  13  1,200 
Neisseria gonorrhoeae  0.3  50  48  98  96 
Haemophilus influenzae 
(invasive) 
3.0  3  3  6  100 
Hepatitis A  0.0  1  -  1  - 
Hepatitis B  0.5  4  3  7  75 
Hepatitis C  3.6  5  22  27  440 
Influenza  1.2  5  3  8  60 
Group A streptococcal infections 
(invasive) 
2.3
f  7  1  8  14 
Borrelia burgdorferi  1.3  4  3  7  75 
Salmonella sp.  2.7
f  14  6  20  43 
Shigella sp.  0.0  2  1  3  50 
Streptococcus pneumoniae 
(invasive, drug-resistant) 
8.0  1  -  1  - 
Treponema pallidum  0.4  5  21  26  420 
Yersinia sp.  0.0  1  -  1  - 
aAverage days earlier was calculated by comparing the date on which the initial conventional report arrived to the date on which an electronic report was received. Only 
cases received by both means were used to calculate this value. 
bReports for these cases were received by both conventional means (mail, telephone, fax) and the laboratory information network. All reports received through traditional 
reporting were also received by the data clearinghouse. 
cReports for these cases were received only through the data clearinghouse and are not included in the counts for the “electronic and traditional means” column. 
dReceived electronically only/received through both means x 100.  
eSignificant as determined by Student t test (p<0.05). 
fSignificant as determined by Wilcoxon signed rank (p<0.05). pathogens, conditions that are often underreported
(3,5,15). The underreported cases originated from all of
the organizations participating in the electronic reporting
system (data not shown). Review of a subset of underre-
ported cases suggested three common root causes: misin-
terpretation of jurisdictional guidelines, misunderstanding
of reportable specimen criteria, and use of outdated report-
ing guidelines by healthcare providers (failure to report
pathogens recently added to the guidelines, as occurred
with the underreported giardiasis cases). 
The data clearinghouse approach to biosurveillance and
disease reporting also offers opportunities to relieve
healthcare providers from managing multiple jurisdiction-
al relationships, which can lead to underreporting.
Through electronic reporting, data were reported from
patients residing in Kansas whose laboratory work was
performed in Kansas City to both the Department of
Health and Environment (with jurisdiction based on the
state of residence of the patient) and KCHD (with jurisdic-
tion over the performing laboratory). Reducing underre-
porting is a critical step in building a threshold-based auto-
mated alerting infrastructure because the baseline data
gathered by an electronic reporting system is more accu-
rate than that gathered by traditional methods.
During the early stages of this work, we identified a
number of confounding issues. For example, a laboratory
technician entered a report with the word “No” on one line,
followed by “Bordetella pertussis” on the next line, with
the intent of negating the positive result. This type of data
entry error, which led to a few false-positive results propa-
gating into the clearinghouse during the first few weeks of
operation, has also been an issue for other electronic report-
ing systems (8). After recognizing this issue, we added con-
text-sensitive logic to clearly flag a reportable isolate pre-
ceded by “No” or “Not” as a potential false-positive.
We evaluated whether test orders were predictive of
disease incidence. However, in the absence of major out-
breaks during the period evaluated, our data were incon-
clusive. Surveillance of laboratory test orders (i.e., ova and
parasite procedure orders) would be useful as an early
warning of a water-supply contamination crises, such as
that experienced by Milwaukee in 1993 when cryp-
tosporidium contaminated the city water supply and
caused >403,000 illnesses (16). 
Most patients whose results were evaluated by the sys-
tem resided within approximately 150 km of the Kansas
City metropolitan area; however, patients from eastern
Missouri, western Kansas, and other U.S. states also were
evaluated by the system. The area covered by the clearing-
house crosses the state line that transects the Kansas City
metropolitan area. Plans for a national public health infra-
structure (e.g., the National Electronic Disease
Surveillance System [NEDSS] [17]) rely on a process in
which patient results are first sent to the state health
departments and then forwarded to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, currently with identifiable infor-
mation removed. Reconciling duplicate cases without such
information will prove difficult. Systems such as NEDSS
that manage data based on politically defined boundaries
have inherent inefficiencies that could be rectified by
direct reporting to a data clearinghouse. A data clearing-
house can apply jurisdictional filters that control the distri-
bution of reports, while also offering the opportunity to
perform rapid analysis of trends across politically defined
boundaries.
We considered issues that have proven to be challeng-
ing for other electronic reporting projects. In particular, the
use of nonstandardized data, subject to errors in either
database design or during data entry, created challenges.
Overall, we found that the data clearinghouse approach to
biosurveillance offers many benefits, including ease and
speed of implementation, improved timeliness and com-
pleteness of data, efficiency of scale from a central data-
mapping operation, and the ability to deliver data to multi-
ple jurisdictions. 
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Figure 4. Number of
patient encounters evalu-
ated by the data clearing-
house system for poten-
tial reportable events per
zip code.
Table 2. Frequency of field completion for patient demographic 
and care-provider information from initial reports 
  Traditional reporting (%)  Electronic reporting (%) 
Facility  93  97 
Address  32  79
a 
Phone  29  35 
Gender  94  99
a 
Race  38  72
a 
Age  92  98 
Date of birth  38  95
a 
aSignificant change as determined by McNemar’s test (p<0.05). Acknowledgments
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